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Abstract
We introduce a compact graph-theoretic repre-
sentation for multi-party game theory. Our main
result is a provably correct and efficient algo-
rithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria
in one-stage games represented by trees or sparse
graphs.
1 INTRODUCTION
In most work on multi-player game theory, payoffs are rep-
resented in tabular form: if  agents play a game in which
each player has (say) two actions available, the game is
given by  matrices, each of size  , specifying the pay-
offs to each player under any possible combination of joint
actions. For game-theoretic approaches to scale to large
multi-agent systems, compact yet general representations
must be explored, along with algorithms that can efficiently
manipulate them  .
In this work, we introduce graphical models for multi-
player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for com-
puting their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An  -player
game is given by an undirected graph on  vertices and a
set of  matrices. The interpretation is that the payoff to
player  is determined entirely by the actions of player 
and his neighbors in the graph, and thus the payoff matrix
for player  is indexed only by these players. We thus view
the global  -player game as being composed of interacting
local games, each involving (perhaps many) fewer players.
Each player’s action may have global impact, but it occurs
through the propagation of local influences.

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For multi-stage games, there is a large literature on compact
state-based representations for the different stages of the game,
such as stochastic games or extensive form games (Owen 1995).
Our focus is on representing one-stage, multi-player games.
There are many common settings in which such graphical
models may naturally and succinctly capture the underly-
ing game structure. The graph topology might model the
physical distribution and interactions of agents: each sales-
person is viewed as being involved in a local competition
(game) with the salespeople in geographically neighboring
regions. The graph may be used to represent organizational
structure: low-level employees are engaged in a game with
their immediate supervisors, who in turn are engaged in a
game involving their direct reports and their own managers,
and so on up to the CEO. The graph may coincide with the
topology of a computer network, with each machine nego-
tiating with its neighbors (to balance load, for instance).
There is a fruitful analogy between our setting and
Bayesian networks. We propose a representation that is
universal: any  -player game can be represented by choos-
ing the complete graph and the original  -player matrices.
However, significant representational benefits occur if the
graph degree is small: if each player has at most 	
 
neighbors, then each game matrix is exponential only in 	
rather than  . The restriction to small degree seems insuffi-
cient to avoid the intractability of computing Nash equilib-
ria. All of these properties hold for the problem of repre-
senting and computing conditional probabilities in a Bayes
net. Thus, as with Bayes nets, we are driven to ask the nat-
ural computational question: for which classes of graphs
can we give efficient (polynomial-time) algorithms for the
computation of Nash equilibria?
Our main technical result is an algorithm for computing
Nash equilibria when the underlying graph is a tree (or
can be turned into a tree with few vertex mergings). This
algorithm comes in two related but distinct forms. The
first version involves an approximation step, and computes
an approximation of every Nash equilibrium. (Note that
there may be an exponential or infinite number of equilib-
ria.) This algorithm runs in time polynomial in the size of
the representation (the tree and the associated local game
matrices), and constitutes one of the few known cases in
which equilibria can be efficiently computed for a large
class of general-sum, multi-player games. The second ver-
sion of the algorithm runs in exponential time, but allows
the exact computation of all Nash equilibria in a tree. In
an upcoming paper (Littman et al. 2001), we describe a
polynomial-time algorithm for the exact computation of a
single Nash equilibrium in trees. Our algorithms require
only local message-passing (and thus can be implemented
by the players themselves in a distributed manner).
2 RELATED WORK
Algorithms for computing Nash equilibria are well-studied.
McKelvey and McLennan (1996) survey a wide variety of
algorithms covering 2- and  -player games; Nash equilib-
ria and refinements; normal and extensive forms; comput-
ing either a sample equilibrium or exhaustive enumeration;
and many other variations. They note that  -player games
are computationally much harder than 2-player games, in
many important ways. The survey discusses approxima-
tion techniques for finding equilibria in  -player games.
Several of the methods described are not globally conver-
gent, and hence do not guarantee an equilibrium. A method
based on simplicial subdivision is described that converges
to a point with equilibrium-like properties, but is not neces-
sarily near an equilibrium or an approximate equilibrium.
In contrast, for the restricted cases we consider, our algo-
rithms provide running time and solution quality guaran-
tees, even in the case of general-sum,  -player games.
Nash (1951), in the paper that introduces the notion of Nash
equilibria, gives an example of a 3-player, finite-action
game, and shows it has a unique Nash equilibria. Although
all payoffs are rational numbers, Nash shows that the play-
ers’ action probabilities at the equilibrium are irrational.
This suggests that no finite algorithm that takes rational
payoffs and transforms them using addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division will be able to compute exact
equilibrium policies in general. Thus, the existence of an
exact algorithm for finding equilibria in games with tree-
structured interactions shows that these games are some-
what simpler than general  -player games. It also sug-
gests that approximation algorithms are probably unavoid-
able for general  -player games.
Several authors have examined graphical representations
of games. Koller and Milch (2001) describe an extension
of influence diagrams to representing  -player games, and
suggest the importance of exploiting graphical structure in
solving normal-form games. La Mura (2000) describes a
closely related representation, and provides globally con-
vergent algorithms for finding Nash equilibria.
3 PRELIMINARIES
An  -player, two-action
 
game is defined by a set of  ma-
trices  (    ), each with  indices. The entry
 	





 

 specifies the payoff to player 
when the joint action of the  players is 
fffi

ffifl
 
.
Thus, each   has   entries. If a game is given by simply
listing the  entries of each of the  matrices, we will say
that it is represented in tabular form.
The actions 0 and 1 are the pure strategies of each player,
while a mixed strategy for player  is given by the proba-
bility !  #" fi

%$ that the player will play 0. For any joint
mixed strategy, given by a product distribution ! , we define
the expected payoff to player  as  &! ')(+*,- *. "  
  $ ,
where 
0/1! indicates that each 
32 is 0 with probability ! 2
and 1 with probability '45! 2 .
We use ! " 768!:9 $ to denote the vector which is the same as

! except in the  th component, where the value has been
changed to ! 9 . A Nash equilibrium for the game is a mixed
strategy ! such that for any player  , and for any value
!:9

;"<fi

	$ ,
 	&
!
0=
 	&
!
"
>6?!:9

$

. (We say that !  is a
best response to ! .) In other words, no player can improve
their expected payoff by deviating unilaterally from a Nash
equilibrium. The classic theorem of Nash (1951) states that
for any game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the space
of joint mixed strategies (product distributions).
We will also use the standard definition for approximate
Nash equilibria. An @ -Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy

! such that for any player  , and for any value !:9 A"<fi

	$ ,

	&
!
CB
@
=

	&
!
"
6D!:9

$

. (We say that !  is an @ -best
response to

! .) Thus, no player can improve their expected
payoff by more than @ by deviating unilaterally from an
approximate Nash equilibrium.
An  -player graphical game is a pair E
F
 , where E
is an undirected graph on  vertices and
F
is a set of 
matrices  ( G   ), called the local game matri-
ces. Player  is represented by a vertex labeled  in E .
We use HI   KJ  
	

fl to denote the set of neigh-
bors of player  in E —that is, those vertices L such that
the undirected edge  

L
 appears in E . By convention,
H>I


 always includes  itself. The interpretation is that
each player is in a game with only their neighbors in E .
Thus, if M H>I    M  	 , the matrix  has 	 indices, one for
each player in HI    , and if 
#N" fi

%$PO ,



 denotes
the payoff to  when his 	 neighbors (which include him-
self) play 
 . The expected payoff under a mixed strategy

!
;"<fi

%$QO is defined analogously. Note that in the two-
action case,   has  O entries, which may be considerably
R
For simplicity, we describe our results for the two-action
case. However, we later describe an efficient generalization of
the approximation algorithm to multiple actions.
S
For simplicity, we shall assume all payoffs are bounded in
absolute value by 1, but all our results generalize (with a linear
dependence on maximum payoff).
smaller than 

.
Since we identify players with vertices in E , and since
it will sometimes be easier to treat vertices symbolically
(such as  


and  ) rather than by integer indices, we
also use  to denote the local game matrix for the player
identified with vertex  .
Note that our definitions are entirely representational, and
alter nothing about the underlying game theory. Thus, ev-
ery graphical game has a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
every game can be trivially represented as a graphical game
by choosing E to be the complete graph, and letting the
local game matrices be the original tabular form matrices.
Indeed, in some cases, this may be the most compact graph-
ical representation of the tabular game. However, exactly
as for Bayesian networks and other graphical models for
probabilistic inference, any time in which the local neigh-
borhoods in E can be bounded by 	  , exponential
space savings accrue. Our main results identify graphical
structures for which significant computational benefits may
also be realized.
4 ABSTRACT TREE ALGORITHM
In this section, we give an abstract description of our al-
gorithm for computing Nash equilibria in trees (see Fig-
ure 1). By “abstract”, we mean that we will leave unspec-
ified (for now) the representation of a certain data struc-
ture, and the implementation of a certain computational
step. After proving the correctness of this abstract algo-
rithm, in subsequent sections we will describe two instan-
tiations of the missing details—yielding one algorithm that
runs in polynomial time and computes approximations of
all equilibria, and another algorithm that runs in exponen-
tial time and computes all exact equilibria.
If E is a tree, we can orient this tree by choosing an arbi-
trary vertex to be the root. Any vertex on the path from a
vertex to the root will be called downstream from that ver-
tex, and any vertex on a path from a vertex to a leaf will be
called upstream from that vertex. Thus, each vertex other
than the root has exactly one downstream neighbor (child),
and perhaps many upstream neighbors (parents). We use

	
I

 
 to denote the set of vertices in E that are upstream
from   , including   by definition.
Suppose that  is the child of   in E . We let E de-
note the the subgraph induced by the vertices in 
	
I

 

.
If   "<fi

	$ is a mixed strategy for player (vertex)  ,
F


will denote the subset of matrices of
F
corre-
sponding to the vertices in 	
I

 
 , with the modifica-
tion that the game matrix   is collapsed by one index
by fixing    . We can think of a Nash equilibrium for
the graphical game E
F


 as an equilibrium “up-
stream” from   (inclusive), given that  plays  .
Suppose some vertex  has 	 parents  

	
 
O
, and the
single child  . We now describe the data structures sent
from each    to  , and in turn from  to  , on the down-
stream pass of the algorithm.
Each parent    will send to  a binary-valued table
 





. The table is indexed by the continuum of pos-
sible values for the mixed strategies   "<fi

	$ of  and

  "<fi

	$ of    . The semantics of this table will be as fol-
lows: for any pair  



 ,
 




 will be 1 if and only if
there exists a Nash equilibrium for E
 F


 in which
  



. Note that we will slightly abuse notation by let-
ting   



 refer both to the entire table sent from    to

, and the particular value associated with the pair  



 ,
but the meaning will be clear from the context.
Since  and   are continuous variables, it is not obvious
that the table   



 can be represented compactly, or
even finitely, for arbitrary vertices in a tree. As indicated
already, for now we will simply assume a finite represen-
tation, and show how this assumption can be met in two
different ways in later sections.
The initialization of the downstream pass of the algorithm
begins at the leaves of the tree, where the computation of
the tables is straightforward. If   is a leaf and  its only
child, then   


 
 if and only if     is a best
response to    (step 2c of Figure 1).
Assuming for induction that each    sends the table






 to

, we now describe how  can compute the ta-
ble  


 to pass to its child  (step 2(d)ii of Figure 1).
For each pair ff


 ,




 is set to 1 if and only if there
exists a vector of mixed strategies    
 

O
 (called
a witness) for the parents

 


 
	
 
O
 of  such that
1.






 
 for all     	 ; and
2.    is a best response to

 







.
Note that there may be more than one witness for

ff


 
 . In addition to computing the value  ff



on the downstream pass of the algorithm,  will also keep
a list of the witnesses  for each pair 


 for which

ff


 
 (step 2(d)iiA of Figure 1). These witness lists
will be used on the upstream pass. Again, it is not obvious
how to implement the described computation of  ff



and the witness lists, since  is continuous and universally
quantified. For now, we assume this computation can be
done, and describe two specific implementations later.
To see that the semantics of the tables are preserved by the
abstract computation just described, suppose that this com-
putation yields  ff


 
 for some pair 


 , and let 
be a witness for  ff


7
 . The fact that   



 

for all  (condition 1 above) ensures by induction that if 
plays  , there are upstream Nash equilibria in which each
  



. Furthermore,  is a best response to the local set-
tings  




	
 
O


O




9 (condition 2 above).
Algorithm TreeNash
Inputs: Graphical game
 
in which

is a tree.
Output: A Nash equilibrium for
 	
.
1. Compute a depth-first ordering of the vertices of

.
2. (Downstream Pass) For each vertex 
 in depth-first ordering (starting at the leaves):
(a) Let vertex  be the child of 
 (or nil if 
 is the root).
(b) Initialize    to be 0 and the witness list for    to be empty for all  fiff .
(c) If 
 is a leaf:
i. For all
flffi ff
, set 
 
to be 1 if and only if 
! 

is a best response to " 

(as determined by the local game matrix #ffi$ ).
(d) Else ( 
 is an internal vertex):
i. Let %
&
 
 
&

'''
&)(

be the parents of 
 ; let 
 *,+-
be the table passed from
&
+
to 
 on
the downstream pass.
ii. For all
	 ff
and all joint mixed strategies
%
*
 
 *

'''	*
(

for %
&
:
A. If 
. 

is a best response to / 

and %
&
 
%
* (as determined by the local game
matrix #ffi$ ), and   *,+-   for 01 23334 , set    to be 1 and add
%
*
to the
witness list for 
 
.
(e) Pass the table   	 from 
 to  .
3. (Upstream Pass) For each vertex 
 in reverse depth-first ordering (starting at the root):
(a) Let %&    &  ''' & (  be the parents of 
 (or the empty list if 
 is a leaf); let  be the child of

 (or nil if 
 is the root), and   the values passed from  to 
 on the upstream pass.
(b) Label 
 with the value  .
(c) (Non-deterministically) Choose any witness
%
*
to 
 	
 

.
(d) For 05 26'''4 , pass  *,+ from 
 to & + .
Figure 1: Abstract algorithm TreeNash for computing Nash equilibria of tree graphical games. The description is incom-
plete, as it is not clear how to finitely represent the tables  7

7
 , or how to finitely implement step 2(d)ii. In Section 5, we
show how to implement a modified version of the algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in polynomial time. In
Section 6, we implement a modified version that computes exact equilibria in exponential time.
Therefore, we are in equilibrium upstream from  . On the
other hand, if  ff


 
fi it is easy to see there can be no
equilibrium in which   



 . Note that the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium guarantees that  ff


 

for at least one 


 pair.
The downstream pass of the algorithm terminates at the
root 8 , which receives tables  :9
;

 from each parent <  .
8 simply computes a one-dimensional table  9  such that

9
 
 if and only if for some witness 
;
,

:9
;

 

for all  , and 9 is a best response to 
;
.
The upstream pass begins by 8 choosing any 9 for which

9
0
 , choosing any witness 
;

	;
O
 to

:9
0
 , and then passing both 9 and
;

to each parent <  . The
interpretation is that 8 will play 9 , and is instructing <  to
play
;

. Inductively, if a vertex  receives a value  to play
from its downstream neighbor  , and the value  that 
will play, then it must be that  ff


 
 . So  chooses
a witness  to  ff


K
 , and passes each parent   
their value   as well as  (step 3 of Figure 1). Note that
the semantics of  


 
 ensure that    is a best
response to

 







.
We have left the choices of each witness in the upstream
pass non-deterministic to emphasize that the tables and wit-
ness lists computed represent all the Nash equilibria. Of
course, a random equilibrium can be chosen by making
these choices random. We discuss the selection of equi-
libria with desired global properties in Section 7.
Theorem 1 Algorithm TreeNash computes a Nash equi-
librium for the tree game E
F

. Furthermore, the tables
and witness lists computed by the algorithm represent all
Nash equilibria of  E
F

.
5 APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe an instantiation of the miss-
ing details of algorithm TreeNash that yields a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria
for the tree game  E
F

. The approximation can be made
arbitrarily precise with greater computational effort.
Rather than playing an arbitrary mixed strategy in "<fi

	$ ,
each player will be constrained to play a discretized mixed
strategy that is a multiple of = , for some = to be determined
by the analysis. Thus, player  plays >   &fi

=


=

&fl ,
and the joint strategy > falls on the discretized = -grid
fi

=


=
 
ffifl

. In algorithm TreeNash, this will allow
each table   


 (passed from vertex   to child  ) to be
represented in discretized form as well: only the 
 
=
 
en-
tries corresponding to the = -grid choices for   and  are
stored, and all computations of best responses in the algo-
rithm are modified to be approximate best responses. We
return to the details of the approximate algorithm after es-
tablishing an appropriate value for the grid resolution = .
To determine an appropriate choice of = (which in turn will
determine the computational efficiency of the approxima-
tion algorithm), we first bound the loss in payoff to any
player caused by moving from an arbitrary joint strategy !
to the nearest strategy on the = -grid.
Fix any mixed strategy ! for  E
F
 and any player index
 , and let M H>I    M  	 . We may write the expected payoff
to  under ! as:
 &
!
  
*
,

	

O

2


2 
82
 
 



(1)
where we simply define

2 
82
 

!
2


, 
 4 !
2

,
.
Note that

2  
32

 "<fi

	$ always.
We will need the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2 Let !


>
 " fi

%$PO satisfy M !  4!>  MC = for all
    	 . Then provided =+ 
 

	fiff
 

	
 

 ,
fl
fl
fl
fl
fl
O




!

4
O




>

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fl
fl



	ffiff 	

=

Proof: By induction on 	 . Assume without loss of gen-
erality that 	 is a power of 2. The lemma clearly holds for
	


. Now by induction:
O




>

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O 
 




>


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 
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=
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 
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
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
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 

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 
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The lemma holds if 4  	 = B  	  fiff  	
 


=

 

fi
. Solving
for = yields =0 
 

	,fiff
 

	
 


.
Lemma 3 Let the mixed strategies !


> for E
F
 satisfy
M !

4 >

M = for all  . Then provided =0     	fiff
 

	
 

  ,
M
 &
!

4
 &
>

M8

O
%


	fiff

	
 
=

Proof: Applying Lemma 2 to each term of Equation (1)
yields
M
 	&
!

4
 	&
>

M


*
,fifi
	

fl
fl
fl
fl
fl
fl
O

2

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
4
O

2

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82

fl
fl
fl
fl
fl
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M
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M
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
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=ff

O
%

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
=
where

2  
 2
 

!
2


, 
#4 !
2

,
,
-
2  
 2
 

>
2


, 
'4 >
2

,.
, and we have used M  
  M8  .
Lemma 3 bounds the loss suffered by any player in mov-
ing to the nearest joint strategy on the = -grid. However,
we must still prove that Nash equilibria are approximately
preserved:
Lemma 4 Let ! be a Nash equilibrium for  E
F
 , and
let > be the nearest (in /

metric) mixed strategy on the
= -grid. Then provided =  
 

	fiff
 

	
 

  ,

> is a

O
%D 

	0ffiff

	

= -Nash equilibrium for E
 F

.
Proof: Let 1  be a best response for player  to > . We now
bound the difference  ffi> "  61  $  4  	&>  = fi , which is
accomplished by maximizing  	&> "  621  $  and minimizing

	&
>

. By Lemma 3, we have
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Since ! is an equilibrium,  	&! '=  ffi! "  6fi1  $  . Thus,
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On the other hand, again by Lemma 3,
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Let us now choose = to satisfy  O
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  (which is the condition required by
Lemma 3), or
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Lemma 4 finally establishes that by restricting play to the
= -grid, we are ensured the existence of an @ -Nash equilib-
rium. The important point is that = needs to be exponen-
tially small only in the local neighborhood size 	 , not the
total number of players  .
It is now straightforward to describe the details of our ap-
proximate algorithm ApproximateTreeNash. This algo-
rithm is identical to algorithm TreeNash with the following
exceptions:
Figure 2: An example game, and the tables computed by the downstream pass of algorithm ApproximateTreeNash. Each vertex in
the tree is a player with two actions. Although we omit the exact payoff matrices, intuitively each “M” player maximizes its payoff by
matching its child’s action, while each “O” player maximizes its payoff by choosing the opposite action of its child. The relative payoff
for matching or unmatching is modulated by the parent values, and also varies from player to player within each vertex type. The grid
figures next to each edge are a visual representation of the actual tables computed in the downstream pass of the algorithm, with the
settings    
' 
and   
 ' 
; 1s are drawn as black and 0s as gray. Approximate Nash equilibria for the game are computed from the
tables by the upstream pass of the algorithm. One example of a pure equilibrium is
 - 62   
; the tables represent a multitude
of mixed equilibria as well.
 The algorithm now takes an additional input @ .
 For any vertex
 
with child  , the table   


 will
contain only entries for  and  multiples of = .
 All computations of best responses in algorithm
TreeNash become computations of @ -best responses
in algorithm ApproximateTreeNash.
Lemma 3 establishes that there will be such an approximate
best response on the = -grid, while Lemma 4 ensures that the
overall computation results in an @ -Nash equilibrium. For
the running time analysis, we simply note that each table
has  
 
=

 
entries, and that the computation is dominated
by the downstream calculation of the tables (Step 2(d)ii of
algorithm TreeNash). This requires ranging over all table
entries for all 	 parents, a computation of order  
 
=

 

O .
Theorem 5 For any @ fi , let
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Then ApproximateTreeNash computes an @ -Nash equilib-
rium for the tree game E
 F

. Furthermore, for every
exact Nash equilibrium, the tables and witness lists com-
puted by the algorithm contain an @ -Nash equilibrium that
is within = of this exact equilibrium (in /

norm). The run-
ning time of the algorithm is polynomial in    @ ,  and  O ,
and thus polynomial in the size of  E
F

.
See Figure 2 for an example of the behavior of algorithm
ApproximateTreeNash.
6 EXACT ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe an implementation of the miss-
ing details of algorithm TreeNash that computes exact,
rather than approximate, equilibria. In the worst case, the
algorithm may run in time exponential in the number of
vertices. We remind the reader that even this result is
nontrivial, since there are no finite-time algorithms known
for computing exact Nash equilibria in general-sum, multi-
party games.
As before, let

 

 
&	
 
O
be the parents of  , and 
the child. We assume for induction that each table   




passed from    to  on the downstream pass can be repre-
sented in a particular way—namely, that the set of  




pairs where   




 is a finite union of axis-parallel
rectangles (or line segments or points, degenerately) in the
unit square. We formalize this representation by assuming
each   



 is given by an ordered list called the  -list,
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
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 . For each  -
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$ (   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	$



	


727 7


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
	

where each  	2 J " fi

%$ is an interval of "<fi

	$ , and these
intervals are disjoint without loss of generality. By taking
the maximum, we can assume without loss of generality
that the number of sets   in the union associated with any
 -interval is the same. The interpretation of this represen-
tation is that   



 
 if and only if  ff"  	

 	
%

$
implies    


	


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

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
. We think of each " 
	


	
%

$ as
defining a horizontal strip of   



 , while the associated
union 


	


7 727




	
 defines vertical bars where the table
is 1 within this strip.
We can assume that the tables   



 share a common
 -list, by simply letting this common  -list be the merging
of the 	 separate  -lists. Applying algorithm TreeNash
to this representation, we now must address the following
question for the computation of  ff


 in the downstream
pass. Fix a  -interval "  	

 	
%

$ . Fix any choice of 	 indices
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, what
is the set  of values of  for which some   "  	

 	
%

$
is a best response to  and  ?
Assuming 
	 fi and 
	 %



 (which is the more dif-
ficult case), a value in " 
	


	
%

$ can be a best response
to

 and  only if the payoff for   fi is identical to
the payoff for    , in which case any value in "<fi

	$
(and thus any value in "  	


	
%

$ ) is a best response. Thus,

ff


 will be 1 across the region  ' "  	


	
%

$ , and
the union of all such subsets of  '  across all  4)
choices of the  -interval "  	


	
%

$ , and all   O choices of the
indices L
	
L
O
 

 
 
fl , completely defines where

ff


 
 . We now prove that for any fixed choice of
 -interval and indices, the set  is actually a union of at
most two intervals of  , allowing us to maintain the induc-
tive hypothesis of finite union-of-rectangle representations.
Lemma 6 Let  be a player in any 	 B  -player game
against opponents
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	
 
O
and  . Let   


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denote the expected payoff to  under the mixed strategies
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tinuous intervals in "<fi
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Then  is either empty, a continuous interval in "<fi

	$ , or
the union of two continuous intervals in "<fi

	$ .
Proof: We begin by writing
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Note that for any   ,  


 is a linear function of   , as
each term of the sum above includes only either   or 84   .
Since  


 is a linear function of   , it is a monotonic
function of   ; we will use this property shortly.
Now by the continuity of  
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 in  , #  if and only
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First consider   , as the argument for   is symmetric.
Now     if and only if 3 * fffffifl
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

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
fl
=
fi
. But since  


 is a monotonic function of each


, this maximum occurs at one of the  O extremal points
(vertices) of the region 

'
727 7
'

O
. In other words,
if we let  2  "  2

1
2
$ and define the extremal set ffi 

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1

fl
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For any fixed  , the set   6# 


 =
fi
fl is of the form
"<fi



$ or
"<


%$ by linearity, and so 	 (and 	 as well) is
either empty, an interval, or the union of two intervals. The
same statement holds for   $%
&$ . Note that by the
above arguments,  can be computed in time exponential
in 	 by exhaustive search over the extremal set ffi .
Lemma 6 proves that any fixed choice of one rectangular
region (where the table is 1) from each   



 leads to at
most 2 rectangular regions where  ff


 is 1. It is also
easy to show that the tables at the leaves have at most 3
rectangular regions. From this it is straightforward to show
by induction that for any vertex  in the tree with child  ,
the number of rectangular regions where   


 
 is at
most
')("*"+(
, where ,  and -  are the number of internal
vertices and leaves, respectively, in the subtree rooted at  .
This is a finite bound (which is at most *  at the root of the
entire tree) on the number of rectangular regions required
to represent any table in algorithm TreeNash. We thus have
given an implementation of the downstream pass—except
for the maintainence of the witness lists. Recall that in the
approximation algorithm, we proved nothing special about
the structure of witnesses, but the witness lists were finite
(due to the discretization of mixed strategies). Here these
lists may be infinite, and thus cannot be maintained explic-
itly on the downstream pass. However, it is not difficult to
see that witnesses can easily be generated dynamically on
the upstream pass (according to a chosen deterministic rule,
randomly, non-deterministically, or with some additional
bookkeeping, uniformly at random from the set of all equi-
libria). This is because given 


 such that  ff


 
 ,
a witness is simply any  such that   



 
 for all  .
Algorithm ExactTreeNash is simply the abstract algorithm
TreeNash with the tables represented by unions of rectan-
gles (and the associated implementations of computations
Figure 3: Example of a table produced by the exact algorithm.
The table is the one generated for vertex 6 in Figure 2. Black
cells indicate where the exact table is 1, while dark gray cells
indicate where the approximate table is 1 for comparison. We see
that the non-rectangular regions in Figure 2 are the result of the
approximation scheme.
described in this section), and witnesses computed on the
upstream pass. We thus have:
Theorem 7 Algorithm ExactTreeNash computes a Nash
equilibrium for the tree game  E
F

. Furthermore, the
tables computed by the algorithm represent all Nash equi-
libria of E
F

. The algorithm runs in time exponential
in the number of vertices of E .
To provide a feel for the tables produced by the exact al-
gorithm, Figure 3 shows the exact table for vertex 6 in the
graph game in Figure 2.
7 EXTENSIONS
We have developed a number of extensions and generaliza-
tions of the results presented here. We describe some of
them briefly, leaving details for the long version of this pa-
per. At this writing, we have verified these extensions only
for the approximation algorithm, and are working on the
generalizations for the exact algorithm.
Multiple Actions. For ease of exposition, our approxima-
tion algorithm was presented for tree games in which play-
ers have only two actions available to them. By letting the
tables  


 computed in the downstream pass of this
algorithm be of the size necessary to represent the cross-
product of the action spaces available to  and  , we can
recover the same result (Theorem 5) for the multiple-action
case. The computational cost in the multiple-action case is
exponential in the number of actions, but so is the size of
the local game matrices (and hence the size of the repre-
sentation of the tree game).
Vertex Merging for Sparse Graphs. The extension to
multiple actions also permits the use of our approxima-
tion algorithm on arbitrary graphs. This is analogous to the
use of the polytree algorithm on sparse, non-tree-structured
Bayes nets. As in that case, the main step is the merging of
vertices (whose action set will now be the product action
space for the merged players) to convert arbitrary graphs
into trees. To handle the merged vertices, we must en-
sure that the merged players are playing approximate best
responses to each other, in addition to the upstream and
downstream neighbors. With this additional bit of com-
plexity (again proportional to the size of the representation
of the final tree) we recover our result (Theorem 5).
As with the polytree algorithm, running time will scale ex-
ponentially with the largest number of merged players, so
it is vital to minimize this cluster size. How best to accom-
plish this we leave to future work.
Special Equilibria. The approximation algorithm has the
property that it finds an approximate Nash equilibrium for
every exact Nash equilibrium. The potential multiplicity
of Nash equilibria has led to a long line of research in-
vestigating Nash equilibria satisfying particular properties.
By appropriately augmenting the tables computed in the
downstream pass of our algorithm, it is possible to identify
Nash equilibria that (approximately) maximize the follow-
ing measures in the same time bounds:
 Player Optimum: Expected reward to a chosen player.
 Social Optimum: Total expected reward, summed over
all players.
 Welfare Optimum: Expected reward to the player
whose expected reward is smallest.
Equilibria with any of these properties are known to be NP-
hard to find in the exact case, even in games with just two
players (Gilboa and Zemel 1989).
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